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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
- The Utah Court of Appeals has iiirisdlction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. !; " 8 J a -u." In ,1'^b) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Is the evidence asceri-r.:,-;.. . „: - -
sustain its judgment that the parties were noc married as -; riatter 
of common law, pursuant • <' ' • :- " ^ " anr:; ;ary t- that-
question, is whether :... -tga- -.-i^i. i^:^. -v,^^ 
are "harmless error" when reviewed .Ight of the Findings of 
Far- . Til-Lb issue was presented to r1-- ^ourt below in Appellee's 
Memorandum in Opposite— ... ^p.-.ant s Mot... •- -.•: 
Findings ' - ,-* " and ,'or:.: - asions of Law, (R.3 31-4- :'he Cour: ^ 
Findirv?c • " • * •.-,*••-- — been challenged; and no request has been 
made for a transcript. Therefore, the Court's Finding' of Fact 
cannot be overturned. 
CONSTITUTIONAL
 P R O VisiONS AND S T A T I J T Es 
DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
The statute determinative on appeal n \ J'." J 4 l M <" A ' eL 
forth in full i i 1 Appellant's Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Appellee accepts the statement of the case set forth by-
Appellant, as far as it goes. Appellant has set forth facts as the 
Trial Court found them. The Trial Court, however, made substantial 
additional findings of fact which have not been challenged by-
Appellant. The record on appeal includes no transcript; and the 
only record of facts which are made part of the record are the 
Findings of Fact made by the Court below. Those findings 
substantiate the ruling of the Court, on any standard of proof. 
Appellant, in his statement of facts, set forth certain facts found 
by the Court below as part of its Findings of Fact. Appellant did 
not, however, set forth all of the Findings of Fact by the Court 
below, which facts are not in dispute. Appellee therefore sets 
forth additional facts as found by the Court below. 
Additional Statement of Facts 
1. During the periods of cohabitation the parties spent time 
with several family friends, including going on trips, like one 
particular Lake Powell trip. During all of those trips the parties 
did not refer to each other as husband or wife. 
2. The friends who knew the parties best believed that the 
parties were living together as a couple but not as husband and 
wife. 
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3. During the period of cohabitation Laura had an intimate 
relationship with one of these friends, contradicting any notion 
that she was married to Mike, although he was living in the marital 
home. 
4. On several occasions during the period of cohabitation 
Mike told Laura that he wanted to be married to her and asked her 
to remarry him. On each of those occasions Laura declined to enter 
into a new marriage with Mike. 
5. The parties filed separate tax returns for 1994 and 1995. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The legal error complained of by Appellant is of little or no 
relevance to the decision of the Trial Court. That decision is 
supported by substantial Findings of Fact, which are not being 
contested. No change in the standard of proof required would 
change the Court's ruling. 
Nevertheless, Appellee believes that the Trial Court used the 
correct standard of proof in its decision making process. 
The time provision of the statute on proving a common law 
marriage at issue; and it is not necessary to attack the 
constitutionality of the law to craft a remedy, should one be 
needed. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER ANY STANDARD OF PROOF, THE COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO 
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE MUST BE SUSTAINED. 
The Court below first reviewed the standard of proof which it 
decided was appropriate to determine the existence of a marriage 
under the controlling statute. Appellee will discuss the standard 
in Point II of this brief. Because Appellee believes the real 
issue is whether Plaintiff proved the necessary facts for the 
existence under any standard, that issue is discussed first. 
The Court set out 5 distinct factors which must be proved to 
meet the requirements of § 3 0-1-4.5. Those factors were that the 
marriage must arise out of a contract between two consenting 
parties who: 
1) are capable of giving consent; 
2) are legally capable of entering into a solemnized 
marriage under the provision of this chapter; 
3) have cohabited; 
4) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; 
and, 
5) hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and 
general reputation as husband and wife. (R. 235-6). 
The Court found that the first four of the five enumerated 
factors existed, by clear and convincing evidence. The Court 
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therefore concentrated its analysis on factor five and the 
underlying and fundamental question of "whether they consented to 
a common law contract" (R. 235) . Appellant does not challenge the 
points on which the Court based its decision; nor does Appellant 
contest the Court's Findings of Fact. Those facts must therefore 
be deemed to be conclusively be deemed to be true. Since Appellant 
only challenges the standard of proof to which he was held, the 
Court's decision must be upheld if that same conclusion would have 
been reached using the standard of proof demanded by Appellant. It 
is established law that a legal error made by the court below which 
is deemed by this Court to have played no part in the decision will 
be insufficient to overturn the decision, if the decision is 
otherwise correct. This principle was set out by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342 
(Utah 1993) when the Court held: 
However, to reverse a trial verdict, this court must find not 
a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the result. 862 P.2d at 1347. 
The failure of Appellant to challenge the Court's decisional 
basis or the facts on which it is based forces Appellant to attack 
the decision on very narrow grounds. Those grounds are simply not 
sufficient to overturn the Court's ruling, and therefore, the 
ruling must be affirmed. 
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The Trial Court found that Plaintiff did not carry his burden 
required by statute that the parties "acquire a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife". In reviewing the statement of 
witnesses on the point, the Court said: 
These witnesses testify that they viewed the parties as 
a couple but never viewed the couple as married. In 
other words, in the home where the parties were residing 
they were not viewed by their most intimate friends as a 
married couple. Yet these were the friends of the 
parties, the ones who knew them best. If they did not 
view Mike and Laura as husband and wife, one well may 
wonder who did view them as husband and wife (R. 234). 
The Court then reviewed the issue of consent. As to 
Defendant, the Court stated: 
Not only does Mike fail to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that the parties acquired a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife, he has failed to establish 
that each party consented to a common law marriage 
relationship. 
In this case there is no single, clear fact demonstrating that 
Laura consented to a common law marital contract. In fact the 
evidence is to the contrary. On several occasions Mike asked 
Laura to marry him. Each time she refused. That she rejected 
his several proposals is evidence that she had not consented 
to a marital relationship. 
While consent must be established, as noted by the Supreme 
Court in Whvte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 791, n. 3 (Utah 1994), 
mutual consent can be shown by acquiescence. The facts 
establish that for her own financial benefit Laura 
affirmatively held herself out to the insurance company as 
Mike's wife. To void embarrassment she held herself out to 
the church representatives as Mike's wife. For a time she 
wore a ring on her marriage finger. For several months she 
allowed Mike to live in the home, enjoying a conjugal 
relationship and sharing family expenses. All of these 
demonstrate some measure of acquiescence by her in the 
existence of a marital relationship. On the other hand that 
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acquiescence is overcome by her own continued insistence that 
the parties not remarry. She knowingly chose not to accept 
Mike's marriage proposals. That evidence, which is clear and 
convincing, off-sets any alleged acquiescence in a marital 
relationship. Laura knew Mike wanted to remarry and 
repeatedly declined. Rather than evidencing consent, this 
evidence is just the opposite, an insistent lack of consent, 
(emphasis added) . (R. 233) . 
The findings of the trial court, especially as to consent, 
deny the existence of a marriage, even under the lower standard of 
preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing the factual findings as 
the Court has done, one cannot suggest that a review on any other 
standard would bring a different result. The Trial Court has 
reviewed this matter carefully and completely; and there is 
insufficient evidence on which to base a reversal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW USED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF PROOF IN REVIEWING THE 
EXISTENCE OF A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE. 
This is an action in which Plaintiff sought to establish a 
common law marriage. The parties had previously been married and 
divorced; but the parties continued to live together for periods of 
time thereafter. The attempt to establish a common law marriage 
was made in order to improve the settlement to Defendant as a 
result of the original decree. The Court first found that the 
establishment of a marriage in this manner should be by clear and 
convincing evidence; and the Court then found that the elements of 
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the common law marriage had not been so established. The Court 
filed a detailed written decision relying on substantial case law 
from other states. The Court also reviewed public policy of the 
State of Utah and found the higher standard of proof was 
appropriate. In doing so, the Court again cited Whyte v. Blair, in 
which the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Care must be given to guard against fraudulent marriage 
claims, especially where a declaration of marriage would 
reap financial rewards for an alleged spouse. (885 P.2d 
at 795. 
The Trial Court used due care and found that the standard of 
proof had not been met. In support of that finding, the Court 
referred to fourteen other states which have used the clear and 
convincing standard of proof in cases to determine the existence of 
a common law marriage; and found only nine states which use the 
preponderance of evidence standard (R. 240-241). Appellant argues 
that the Trial Court was wrong in its counting of cases. Using a 
different methodology, Appellant argues that there are only fifteen 
states which currently recognize common law marriage, and that only 
five of those use the clear and convincing standard (Appellant's 
brief, p. 10-11) . The numbers of states which fall into each 
category is open to interpretation and even manipulation. In 
finding fault with the Lower Court's count, however, Appellant 
seems to be ignoring the obvious. Many states have abolished 
common law marriage, apparently believing that the abuses of such 
8 
a doctrine outweigh any advantages. One might suggest that this 
puts a solid majority of other states in a third category; one in 
which NO evidence is sufficient to prove a common law marriage. 
This position supports the conclusion of the Trial Court that 
common law marriages should be declared only in cases where the 
evidence is clear and convincing; and that extra care is needed to 
avoid abuse. 
Many of the decisions cited by both the Lower Court and 
Appellant are somewhat vague, in that public policy arguments are 
not fully discussed. One case of interest is one that Appellant • 
cites for his contention. In that case, Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company v. Johnson, 645 P.2d 356 (Idaho 1983), the Idaho 
Court admits that it is in the minority in using the preponderance 
standard: 
We note that Idaho is among the dwindling minority of states 
which continue to recognize common law marriage. In 1952, 
twenty American jurisdictions could be listed as recognizing 
common law marriage. By 1960, the number was sixteen, and by 
1974 the number had diminished fourteen. 
The trend toward abolition of common law marriage indicates an 
obvious hostility to the doctrine. That hostility is not 
confined to those states which do not recognize common law 
marriages. The courts of many jurisdictions recognizing the 
doctrine also view it with disfavor. 
Thus, to discourage common law marriage claims, many . 
jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine impose stringent 
evidentiary burdens on the party seeking to establish a common 
law marriage. (Internal citations omitted) 645 P.2d at 3 59-
360. 
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While Idaho law applies the preponderance standard, it also 
emphasizes the element of consent. In this case, the Trial Court 
specifically found a lack of consent; and that finding has not been 
challenged in this appeal. This Court should be very cautious in 
overruling the Lower Court and finding a marriage here. Clearly 
the parties were married at one time; and they have had a very 
stormy relationship since that time. It would be to Appellant's 
advantage materially to prove that a marriage continued after the 
divorce became final, as Appellant contends that the divorce 
settlement was not fair (R. 244). This is not the time or manner 
to contest such things, however. He had his opportunity to do so 
in the context of the divorce action, and chose not to do so. That 
decision is now binding on him. There is some evidence that 
Appellant wants to prove the existence of a continuing marriage 
simply to spite Appellee, as the Trial Court found a pattern of 
abusive behavior on the part of both parties; and noted that mutual 
protective orders have been entered to keep the parties apart (R. 
243-4) . Failing to guard the public interests which the Lower 
Court cited in determining its burden of proof would indeed result 
in an injustice in this instance. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE HAS NO MERIT; NOR IS IT 
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES AT HAND. 
Plaintiff also questions the legality of § 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. as 
being in conflict with certain portions of the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiff argues that the portion of the law which requires proof 
within one year of the termination of the relationship is 
unconstitutional as it would not allow Defendant to establish the 
relationship he seeks even on a successful appeal, as that appeal 
would be too late. Defendant suggests that this Court is able to 
craft a remedy as it sees fit. Declaring the statute invalid would 
not give Plaintiff any remedy. The Court has ruled, based on the 
facts, that Plaintiff has not proved the existence of a marital 
relationship. The interpretation of the time provisions is not at 
issue. Plaintiff has quoted Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P. 2d 918 (Utah 
App. 1995) in support of his contention that the time provisions 
"might present a constitutional question in a different context". 
The Court chose not to review that question at the time, as it was 
not relevant to its decision. A constitutional ruling is also not 
relevant here to the decision of the Court. The legislature chose 
to recognize common law marriages under very strict rules. 
Defendant contends that the legislature has the power to set the 
rules for such a recognition, which has long been denied Utah 
residents under any circumstances. The fact that the legislature 
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set such strict recognition rules supports the Lower Court's ruling 
that a higher standard of proof must be used. This is not the type 
of situation that this court referred to in suggesting that a 
review of the constitutionality of the law might be appropriate 
under "different circumstances". Plaintiff has made his showing; 
and he did so within one year, as set forth in the statute. 
Because the underlying facts are not in dispute, no further showing 
after the one year period is necessary. This Court certainly has 
the power to determine that a legal error was made and to reverse 
the Lower Court and declare, on the basis of the facts proved, that 
such a marriage existed. There is no need for a remand or for a 
further hearing below, if the Trial Court made such a legal error. 
The act of this court in correcting the legal error would have the 
effect of declaring the marriage valid as of the time of trial. No 
constitutional attack on the law is necessary. Appellee, of 
course, has set forth what she believes to be a very strong case 
against taking any action. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, 
this Court has many options to correct errors without declaring the 
underlying statute unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court reviewed the issues concerning the existence 
of a common law marriage between the parties hereto according to 
12 
the appropriate standard More important1\ rowever, the Court 
1
 uni f l f u I in MI A p p e 1 1M< ' f i ' • ' L~ - - ~ u - - T s s i f c : : A r ^ rf su^1 
.:; marriage under any standard. Because , :^ :^::s . - , i 
finding of su::: a marriage under any level rr scrutiny, this Coi ~ 
cann :)t - e trial c * ' -~ -sue 
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W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Brief of Appellee, postage prepaid, t_^  ^ieiu. Young, attorney : ~.v 
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ADDENDUM 
I 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
853 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^OURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
---oooOooo-
MICHAEL LOY HANSEN, : FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 1 all it. i f:f , : 
LAURA T HANSEN, : Civil No. 9-34401325-
Deier ldai it. : 
oooOooo-
r
:
;
:. r**r.r--r>r came -•:• * "-~ *~ ri =* . October 24, 1996 and was 
con:. -.:.;..-u :.....;_;__•.. •:;••:.-.,-•':• . : ' f 
was present with his attorney, Bxent Young. Defendant was present 
witl i her attorney, W Andrew McCullough Kel1'." Frve W=LS present as 
Guardian Ad L11 e111 C1 osing arguments wei e nt.;. u ^ -.-.paLaLC 1 • n 
November 27, 19 96, The Court, having heard the evidence and che 
argument of counsel, c:r.ci beir - -dvised in the premises, 
enters its Findings o: - a. .. .-;:.•., J of I .aw: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. r~11-~ r;.-trcies previ " •" were married "~- '\ r*°riod cf 
approximately nine years. T^ o^.* divorce was ti:iu^  
1 
0? 
2. In October 1994 Mike moved back into the former marital 
home with Laura and resided there with her and the children of the 
parties until at least May 1995. 
3. From May 1995 through September 22, 1995 Mike did not 
live at Laura's home nor cohabit with her. 
4. Judge Hansen previously made a finding in a protective 
order action between these parties that Mike lived in Laura's home 
at her request from September 22, 1995, through December 27, 1995. 
5. During the periods of cohabitation Mike routinely turned 
over his paycheck to Laura and then received back some cash as 
"walking around money." 
6. During the periods of cohabitation Laura worked and she 
pooled her money with the money she received from Mike. 
7. Laura used the money she and Mike earned to pay the 
significant credit card debt which Mike had incurred during the 
period of separation preceding their divorce, to pay the home 
mortgage, to pay family living expenses and obligations and to pay 
her debts. 
8. During the period of cohabitation the parties acted much 
like a family. 
9. When the parties' son was of age to be baptized the 
parties met with the local L.D.S. Bishop to arrange for the son's 
2 
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1 JIL :... process neither part) dispelled the appearance 
that: they were a family. 
l A After Mike moved back i^ AT': ' l * --^n *-v,0 membership clerk 
church membership records and was told that Mike lived he 
naritr:! h^uie. The appearance was that he and Laura were back 
t.oyei i/-; 
II. During the periods of cohabitation the parties spent time 
wi t h severa 1 f air1.i 1 v f r iends , i nc 1 udi m aoi n o +~ r ips , like ^ne 
j;at . .». .. ' ;,_._-_ _ i -^ '^  ;.;^_ .J:.I. .es 
cud not re::e: to each other as husband or wife. 
2?. The friends v:h?. knew the parties best believed that ""he 
parties wer e li\ lng together as a c^-^-t out not as husband and 
w i f e . • • 
:° r......^,-. *-1- - - or|od -pf cohabitation Laura had an intimate 
relationship . . . . .: lends, COL;....,;, itlng any notion 
that she was married to Mike, although he was living in the marital 
home. 
14. Laura used Mike's mec^a.. c_... aental Insurance to cover 
the cost of some of her medical treatments. This insurance 
coveraae w " rlaimed bj r her as Mi ke #s wi fe. The coveraae was o~ly 
ava,..a;;^u L ^ ner as a wife ai id she ci aimed the benet 11 oi t.< 1a t 
coverage. 
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15 During the time the parties cohabited Laura held herself 
out as Mike's wife to the insurance carrier. 
16. During the time the parties cohabited each was capable of 
giving consent to a marriage and each was legally capable of 
entering into a solemnized marriage. 
17. During the time the parties cohabited they each assumed 
marital rights, duties and obligations. 
18. During the period of cohabitation Laura frequently wore 
a ring on the finger of her left hand traditionally viewed as her 
marriage finger. 
19. During the period of cohabitation Laura admitted to Mike 
that she felt he had received an inequitable distribution in the 
divorce. She agreed with him that if the parties subsequently 
separated that each would be entitled to one-half of the equity in 
the home. 
20. On several occasions during their period of cohabitation 
Mike told Laura that he wanted to be married to her and asked her 
to remarry him. On each of those occasions Laura declined to enter 
into a new marriage with Mike. 
21. The parties filed separate tax returns for 1994 and 1995. 
22. The complaint in this case was file on October 12, 1995, 
during the course of the cohabitation and alleged common law 
marriage of those parties. 
4 
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•• 23, L_:„ ^i the parties have vioxdced terms of one or more 
orders of the Court. 
O A — U - ~ /"i
 0 U r t p r g V j_ Q U g 2 y g n £ e J-- e (-| a 1T|:1 J I- 1 J Q ] p J- Q t e C |: j V g,, Q J- :| €; r 
1 .* . . ; • oetween the parties and specifical] y restraining 
any harassing or threatening behavior. In defiance of that order 
Laura has struck Mike ar:c Mike ha~ ~r ^. Laura. 
25. f^ :.L:,„:f .: ..s entered _;..LO a pattern ^ siting 
Mike. On one recent occasion she arranged visitation for Mike. 
When he ca^- ----••• > c— 
they saw th t:--.ai.eii enter L:^ i^ uic , ,, .-^  , answer Lhe 
door when the third party knocked V -- n:-:: >;?-:/. * .: h : :IP third 
j^r- v v - ohone an * 
\.-,J •;:;, t:.u ...:-:ier end * ;.,^  pii^n^ anc riri asserted that Mike had 
violated the protective order Then r:.e officer found out us 
i * " <3 
l,y ijj.urci wi MiKe J:* <a:. effort LO MCL -. . trouble witu tiic courts 
for violating protective orders. 
26. Laura "il ; - : • • • ~- • ' 
times when she kuew LI^I protective orders have ^ee,. dismissea b/ 
the Court. •'. • •-. 
2 7 . T . • i • •' . - * • - . > . . 
detailed, written ^rder setting forth t:ie visitat±un schedule t*ur 
example, she denied Mike his UEA visitation with Zeb. 
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28. At least some of Laura's denials of visitation to Mike 
have been made in response to rulings by the Court that went 
against Mxke. w / 
29. Almost all of the actions of Mike and Laura in each 
violating the orders of the court, in harassing each other, in 
involving the police and in fighting and spitting at each other, 
have been witnessed by the children. That alone is grounds for a 
stern response by the Court as the children have been significantly 
impact by the continual fighting of the parents. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court determines that the appropriate standard to 
prove the existence of a common law marriage is by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
2. Both parties are and were capable of giving consent, they 
were and are capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the 
provision of law, they co-habitated, and they mutually assumed 
marital rights, duties and obligations. The parties did not, 
however, acquire a uniform reputation as husband and wife. 
3. There is no proof to the legal standard required that 
Laura consented to the existence of a marital relationship after 
the previous divorce. 
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4." Plaintiff's complaint for the determination of a common 
law marriage should be dismissed, having failed to have proof by 
clear and convincing evidence f^ ; ::ecessarv prerequisites. 
5# ^ The Court finds that: r,ut:, paicies i^ve acted i n contempt 
of court by failing to obey previous orders of the Court. 
'6. The Court intends to impose sanctd ons as seem 
appropriate,, that wi 11 reserve such sanctions untix further hearing 
now set for December 23, 1996, _ ^ • ;fj 
an ember1,-^9 9 6 .' ;:- : 91V rf^k'* DA' 
BY THE COURT:* . , . J ' ^ J S ^ A 
Anthony w. SchQf>el4/: . .Jngg4|) / 
, ^ :OU^  pW 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2T^ I certify that on the «6 / day of December, 1996 mailed 
c r ~ - ^.. . 1 
Conclusions or Law, postage prepaid, to Brent Young, attorney .or 
Plaintiff, I vie and Younq, :-* Box 672, Prove, Utah 84603 and 
! < : - : . • . _ • . • - . - . ! 
84601. 
di vorce\hansen.fof 
0303 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
853 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo---
MICHAEL LOY HANSEN, : JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LAURA T. HANSEN, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
C i v i l No. <23u£lIL1225> 
oooOooo 
Pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
heretofore entered in the above entitled action, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The appropriate standard to determine the existence of a 
common-law marriage is by clear and convincing evidence. 
2. The Court has failed to find by clear and convincing 
evidence the existence of a uniform reputation of the parties as 
husband and wife or that Laura consented to the existence of a 
marital relationship after the previous divorce. 
3. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, no cause of action. 
4. The Court has found that both parties have acted in 
1 
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and the Court reserves sanctions :u: :arther hearing. 
DATED this Y day of FtJVW&*W , I997^*l^y35&..** 
BY THE COURT: ^M^j^%> ''i^'S#^^\+ 
VIM^WA^ 
JUDGE ANTHONY W. SCHOMEli^^S^^ ,.v,f >r 
c—i FICA:: 
I certify that on the 30'^ daY GI December, 1996 T mailed a 
true air: correct copy of r h- foregoing Judgment of Dismissal, 
postage • * ' • • 
Young, :- B ^ t •- Provo, Utah 84603, and Keily Frye, -.. 
Center Street, suite 205, Provo, Utah 84601. 
^J/^^diu 4-t^^hz 
2 
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^/HAl ~0 til J- L I 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
853 West Center Street 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OOOOOOO 
MICHAEL LOY HANSEN, : ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO AMEND 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
LAURA T. HANSEN, : Civil No. 954402169 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
This matter came before Hon. Anthony W. Schofield, Judge of 
the above-entitled Court, pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend 
Judgment. The Court, having considered the memoranda of counsel, 
and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following ORDER: 
1. The Motion to Amend is denied. 
2. The Court concludes, as it previously did, that the 
correct burden of proof to establish a common law marriage is proof 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
3. Plaintiff has raised a constitutional argument as to 
whether he would have an adequate remedy if the Court's decision 
1 
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were reversed on appeal. The constitutional argument is premature 
as there is no assurance that on appeal the appellate courts will 
reverse the trial court judgment. If they do and do not address 
the constitutional argument in their reversal, then the issue of 
the constitutional argument will be ripe for consideration upon 
remand. 
day of Z$z4rk, 19 a*^2-t£rJ? , 
" "~^ SE-
DATED this 5^  of £gU 1 9 ^ 4 ^ , 
BY THE (XH^&'-x^^ SSX' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERV] 
I hereby certify that on the /SP^" day of April, 1997, I did 
mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Order 
Denying Motion to Amend, postage prepaid to, Brent Young, attorney 
for Plaintiff, Ivie & Young, P.O. Box 657, Provo, Utah 84603 and 
Kelly Frye, Guardian Ad Litem, 32 West Center Street, Suite 205, 
Provo, Utah 84 6 01. 
divorce\hansen.oM 
0344 
